Volume 42
Issue 4 Fall 2002
Fall 2002

An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, the Present, and
Back to the Future
Eileen Gauna

Recommended Citation
Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, the Present, and Back to the Future, 42 Nat.
Resources J. 701 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol42/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

EILEEN GAUNA*

An Essay on Environmental Justice:
The Past, the Present, and Back to the
Future
THE PAST
In the late 1980s, right on the heels of a long and arduous struggle
among states, industry, and environmentalists for the heart and soul of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), environmental justice entered the
regulatory scene at the national level. At that time, the EPA was a battleweary agency, recovering from internal scandals,1 at odds with the White
House, the Office of Management and Budget, congressional
subcommittees, and the states.2 The agency was also reeling from
approximately 800 court or congressionally imposed deadlines and was
plagued by lawsuits from all stakeholders for the rules it managed to
promulgate.3 The last thing this demoralized agency needed was the
grassroots, politically explosive charge of environmental racism."
Residents from the grassroots probably knew little of this
regulatory state of siege. What they undoubtedly knew about, through
experience, was the frustration of years of living at the epicenters of our
nation's worst environmental risks. Parents living near refineries positioned
bags of clothing by their doors, ready for the not infrequent refinery
accidents and midnight evacuations, while their children knew well the
"shelter in place" drills that prompted them to go inside and shut all the
windows and doors.' Residents living near commercial hazardous waste
facilities, chemical plants, metal plating shops, and other facilities storing
or using highly-toxic chemicals, looked at those facilities with worry and
suspicion as the cases of childhood leukemia and rare cancers multiplied
within their communities. People in poor rural areas saw their once bucolic
environments irrevocably changed as large concentrated animal feeding
operations sprang up, emitting unbearable smells and contaminating water
supplies. These affected areas were predominantly people-of-color
neighborhoods, and the residents began to wonder why this was so. These
are some of the conditions that caused local organizing efforts to coalesce
into a national effort later called the environmental justice movement.6
Certain landmark events caused the issue of environmental racism
to percolate into the public dialogue. The first was the release in 1987 of a
national study that found a positive correlation between racial minorities
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and proximity tocommercial hazardous waste facilities and uncontrolled
waste sites! The 1991 First National People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C., also raised the profile of these
issues and resulted in the adoption of the Principles of Environmental
Justice by many environmental justice organizations!8 The principles called
for more democratic forms of decision -making and the elimination or
reduction (rather than redistribution) of environmental risk on local to
global scales.9
Suddenly confronted by the charge of racism in environmental
protection, the EPA administrator convened a workgroup to undertake a
review of the then existing evidence of disparities. In 1991, at the conclusion
of the two-year review, the workgroup submitted a report that
acknowledged that racial and ethnic minorities were disproportionately
subjected to exposures to air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities,
contaminated fish, and agricultural pesticides."0 The evidence also revealed
demonstrated disparate adverse health effects from lead poisoning.1 Also
in that year, the National Law Journalpublished an article reporting on an
eight-month investigation that found racial disparity in the enforcement of
federal environmental laws.12 Some of the most alarming findings were that
penalties under federal hazardous waste laws were as much as 500 percent
higher in predominantly white areas than non-white areas (a discrepancy
of 46 percent existed under all federal environmental laws). 3 In the area of
cleanup of contaminated properties, the study concluded that it generally
took longer to place non-white areas on the national priorities list for
cleanup (20 percent longer); cleanup in non-white areas took longer (began
from 12 percent to 42 percent later) and was less protective (EPA chose to
"cap" the contamination seven percent more frequently, while at the white
sites, it chose to remove or treat the contamination 22 percent more often).14
Although these and other studies lent support to the allegations

coming from the grassroots, as one might imagine, the charge of
environmental racism was contested. At this earlier time, those skeptical of
the charge responded in two ways. First, critics argued that the
methodologies of these early studies were flawed. 5 While this criticism was
a fair one, many of the more recent studies, using more sophisticated
techniques, tended to confirm the findings of the earlier studies. 6 Even if
the studies adequately described current conditions, some still questioned
whether the existing racially disparate pattern of location near riskproducing land practices was the product of racial discrimination in the
siting process or was instead the result of more neutral, post-siting market
forces.17 For a while, the debate shifted to a question of which came first, the
polluting facility or the people of color community, i.e., the "discriminatory
siting" theory and the "market dynamics" theory. Although early studies
indicated that race was generally a statistically more significant variable
than income," some proponents of the market dynamics theory insisted
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that noxious and risky practices are located where land is less expensive.
Once the facility is sited, "minority move-in" occurs as the price of housing
declines and the quality of the neighborhood is perceived to decrease.
This debate is itself telling and hints at something more than just
academic quibbling. Some were of the view that the question was important
because resources put into reforming a supposedly discriminatory siting
process would be wasted if market dynamics would cause the racially
disparate pattern to re-emerge. Others argued that the market dynamics
theory seemed to suggest that, if the racially disparate pattern was the result
of market forces, there was no overt racial discrimination involved and,
therefore, resulting conditions were somehow more acceptable. Although
this latter point need not follow logically, the assumption of market
neutrality appeared implicit in the context of this debate because
proponents of the market theory did not generally advocate for aggressive
interference with the market. And as pointed out by Luke Cole and Sheila
Foster, the reality of race discrimination in the housing market affects
individual preferences and mobility, and, as such, the "free" nature of
market choices (to move into or stay in environmentally burdened
communities) must be called into question. 9 Thus, the market dynamics
theory is, if anything, a compelling reason to seriously address market
dynamics, rather than a means by which to weaken the position of
environmental justice advocates in the course of siting controversies.
Moreover, a case can be made that even if the existing disparity is caused
in large part by post-siting market dynamics, a corrective siting process is
still a viable and appropriate way to help offset market-inspired socially
undesirable results.
Although the "chicken and egg" debate 0 continued within
academic and regulatory circles, it was during this time that the movement
itself was broadening to encompass class as well as race disparities, with
many in the movement arguing that neither people of color or the poor
should systematically receive the lion's share of our risk, simply by virtue
of their relative lack of resources and social capital. Although the early
challenges were cast in terms of "environmental racism," the movement
soon broadened to address class disparities, and "environmental justice" or
"environmental injustice" became the terms more often used. Although this
signaled a philosophical shift, as a practical matter, the overburdened
communities tended to be both poor and people of color and organizing in
these communities continued to be the primary focus of the movement.
Meanwhile, as the studies continued, they seemed to raise more
questions than they answered. One national study found a statistical
disparity in siting hazardous waste facilities in Hispanic communities, but
no similar evidence in African-American communities.2 Curiously,
however, the study also found little evidence of post-siting demographic
changes (sometimes called minority move-in).2 How then, did the existing
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disparity arise with respect to the African-American communities?' This
study also found that very poor areas tended to repel, rather than attract,
hazardous waste facilities, a finding that called into question the claim that
the availability of cheap land, not the racial profile of the surrounding
community, was more of a motivating factor in siting decisions. Several
other studies have also found that very poor communities do not host a
disproportionate share of facilities releasing toxic chemicals.'
Another, more recent study in the Los Angeles area found that,
statistically, communities that were experiencing an "ethnic shift" are the
communities of choice for siting risk-producing land practices. The
researchers offered a tentative theory of causation based upon this finding.
They posited that, because the social ties in communities are weakened
when a community is undergoing a population transition from one ethnic
group to another, such communities are less likely to organize and mount
a successful challenge to a facility siting. To what degree do those who
make the site location decision actually seek out such vulnerable
communities can, of course, only be inferred from this circumstantial
statistical evidence. For obvious reasons, direct evidence of racial targeting
is nowhere to be found, although there is some direct evidence of class
targeting.' In any event, the inquiry into the dynamics of the siting process,
and its relationship to race and class, still continues.
The inquiry into causes is an important one, even though in
retrospect the "which came first" debate was too simplistic and perhaps too
flavored with political agendas. A positive result was that the issue
prompted serious study that in turn yielded important information. But one
also has to question whether excessive attention to causation issues tends
to hijack the discourse in critical arenas of potential reform, and whether
there will ever be sufficient evidence to answer this question one way or
another. Are we pursuing chimeras that pull valuable time and resources
from exigent problems? People of color and the poor are, after all,
indisputably disparately exposed to dangerous environmental risks and are
suffering serious illnesses in otherwise unexplained, disturbingly large
numbers.
As one might imagine, environmental justice activists did not stand
idly by awaiting the results of the research and ultimate outcome of this
debate. In a variety of participatory fora, they forcefully demanded a place
at the table.26
The injection of this new movement into an already cacophonous
stakeholder process upset the status quo and proceeded to change the
landscape of environmental regulation. For a while, industry, conventional
environmentalists, agriculture, sister federal agencies, states, and local
agencies were distressed and defensive as the newcomers demonstrated,
made politically explosive charges, and demanded to have a place in the
process. These traditional stakeholders were subsequently even more
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flummoxed as the newcomers declined their invitation to negotiate
tradeoffs in the technocratic jargon of environmental law, science, and
engineering. More often, activists refused to quibble about acceptable
emission or effluent limitations, monitoring protocols, and risk factors; as
indicated earlier, they challenged the siting decision itself on ethical rather
than technical grounds.27
The direct action methods and the initial siting challenges were
only the entry point, however. Unfortunately, the impression of these early
challenges set the environmental justice movement in an inaccurate but
enduring image. Just as one cannot capture the essence of the mainstream
environmental movement solely with the image of young college students
chaining themselves to old growth trees, one cannot fairly capture the
essence of the environmental justice movement with the image of
community residents demonstrating against the siting of a hazardous waste
facility. It is that, to be sure, but it is much more.
A descriptive account of the adaptation of activists to the national
regulatory apparatus, and vice versa, has yet to be comprehensively written
from the perspective of grassroots activists. Yet it is dear that these
dedicated individuals, with meager resources, have tenaciously maintained
strategies that have been remarkably effective.' Entering stakeholder
processes as tokens, they quickly became a force to be taken seriously. In
the ensuing years, activists have moved far beyond siting controversies,
examining environmental injustices in a wide range of functional
contexts-agency decision making, public participation, regulatory policy,
program design, criteria development and other forms of standard setting,
facility permitting, and the cleanup of contaminated sites.29 They
spearheaded the effort that culminated in the signing of an important
executive order on environmental justice by former President Clinton." Due
in large part to their advocacy, which often included taking agency
personnel on "toxic tours" through impacted areas, agencies began to take
a more comprehensive look at cumulative risk." Their activism quickly
moved beyond the EPA to state environmental agencies and other federal
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, Department of the
Interior, the military, etc. 2 They began to litigate not only under the
environmental laws but pursued common law claims, constitutional claims,
and civil rights claims.3 3 One of the most creative and high profile legal
strategies they used was claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.'
These claims, pursued both in court and administratively, caused an uproar
by the regulated community when the EPA issued its guidance to
investigate Title VI claims against state regulatory agencies accused of
discriminatory permitting practices.3 They also used procedural statutes,
such as disclosure laws and planning laws, most effectively. They
participated in federal advisory groups,' educational projects,37 and
interagency collaborative projects.' They formed international coalitions to
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address cross-boundary and global problems. 9 To expand the scope of
efforts thus, while retaining a steadfast loyalty to grassroots organizing and
local campaigns, has been no easy feat. But as irresistible as this story is, it
awaits chronicling in a more comprehensive way.
THE PRESENT
Perhaps the most important contribution the environmental justice
movement has made to environmental regulation has been to bring to the
surface the potential conflict between efficiency and equity and the
complicated interplay between the two principles. This question is an
important one because the philosophical forces underlying efficiency and
equity cannot help but affect environmental policy in profound ways and
the ascendancy of one means, sacrificing, to some degree, the other.
On the efficiency side, the challenge to environmental regulation
has come mainly from industrial interests and the political right. In a more
extreme form of this view, economic efficiency should be the controlling
principal of environmental regulation, not merely an analytical tool used to
choose among plausible, but protective, regulatory options. In other words,
when used in its normative sense, resources (including environmental
necessities) should be allocated to those willing to pay the most for them.
The "willingness to pay" criterion is the foundation upon which efficiency
is measured. The problem with this, as noted by several environmental
scholars,' ° is that willingness to pay is largely dependent upon ability to
pay, and thus resources are not shifted to those who value them most in the
absolute sense, but those who "value" them most in the economic sense, i.e.,
who not only want but can afford them.4" Allocating designer jeans, or even
land, in this manner is not objectionable once one accepts the desirability of
a market economy, but it does not necessarily follow that environmental
necessities that affect public health can or should be distributed this way.
Everyone, regardless of their wealth, should be able to breath clean air and
drink uncontaminated water.
No one that I am aware of seriously contends that efficiency should
be used in this extreme form, well, almost no one.42 However, the line
between efficiency as a prevailing norm and efficiency as an analytic tool
is not a clear one, and the bleeding of one into the other confounds the
pursuit of environmental justice. A good example of this problem can be
found in the interstices of the debate about "command and control"
regulation and the newly termed "environmental innovation."43 Command
and control regulation is a derisive term used to describe the generally
prescriptive nature of environmental pollution control requirements that
were formed under the current set of environmental statutes and the matrix
of regulations they spawned. The quintessential command and control
requirements, for example, are the two pariahs of regulatory control: the
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A
specification standard" and the technology-based standard.'
specification standard, for example, might mandate the use of a certain type
of pollution control equipment, or the use of particular industrial processes
or materials.* A technology-based approach requires control regardless of
the location or particular circumstances of any given facility.47 As the
argument goes, the-one-size-fits-all approach and the micro-management
of industrial processes by bureaucrats has resulted in firms paying an
enormous amount of money to control pollution that should not even be
controlled (for example, when the media can adequately absorb it), or that
can be controlled in a much less expensive manner overall (for example,
when some industrial sectors or individual firms can develop a much less
expensive means of control than that mandated by the statutes and
regulations). 48
At first blush, there is no apparent conflict between the goals of
environmental justice and the goal of fixing regulation to be more efficient.
After all, by definition environmental justice communities are not typically
located in areas where the environmental media (air, land, water) can
adequately absorb the pollution. And in the toxic hot spot areas where
pollution is a serious problem, there should be no objection to allowing
firms to control pollution by less expensive means. Unfortunately, efficiency
in this sense ceases to be benign once one considers the regulatory strategies
currently promoted to achieve more efficient regulation. The case of
markets in pollution is a good example.
Market strategies fall into three broad categories termed "emissions
offset programs," "cap49and trade," and a more recent program termed
"open market trading." These market regimes might operate at a facility
level or within a larger geographic region. An offset program or a cap and
trade program is, in essence, the placement of a metaphoric bubble over an
area that defines the overall pollution limit. With a cap and trade program,
the facility operator has the flexibility to operate its industrial processes as
long as it purchases approved emission credits, thus ensuring that the cap
is not exceeded. With trading programs, firms can therefore reduce, change,
or eliminate expensive controls on individual pieces of polluting equipment
(units) as long as they achieve the same result, in essence "trading" the right
to pollute among units' or even entire facilities over a large geographic
region." Open market trading programs do not have an expressly defined
cap, instead firms are allowed to use emission reduction credits from past
reductions in lieu of installing expensive equipment that might otherwise
be required.5
The problem with these more innovative trading strategies is that,
on a facility level, it is difficult for the affected community to review and
analyze the permit because they are much more complicated than the
traditional technology-based permit requirements. Unless there are
adequate monitoring requirements, it is difficult for the community or an
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enforcement agency to assess ongoing compliance and sue to enforce if
necessary. The problem becomes much more acute once inter-facility, interpollutant, or point-nonpoint trading is allowed, particularly for highly toxic
pollutants. If firms within a geographic region can trade pollution rights
among each other, that leaves open a significant risk of formation of hot
spots within environmental justice communities. One of the most highprofile examples is in California, where refineries were allowed to buy up
"reduction credits" from the scrapping of old cars within the greater Los
Angeles air basin and use those credits in lieu of installing vapor recovery
equipment at their marine terminals.' As a result, the air quality worsened
in the predominantly Latino communities near the three refineries that
purchased most of the credits (and the workers in the refineries continued
to face high risk exposures), even though the air quality of the large basin
as a whole might have improved by retiring some older, heavily polluting
55
cars.

Theoretically, it might be possible to design a trading program that
avoids hot spots and enforcement problems,' and permit review might be
enhanced with adequate provisions for technical assistance to impacted
communities. For example, Ihave discussed elsewhere how a variable offset
rate might be used to encourage pollution reductions (i.e., the generation of
credits) in impacted areas for their use outside of impacted communities,
thus fine-tuning incentives to pull pollution away from, rather than
towards, environmental justice communities.57 Another feature of a
protective market program would be to simply prohibit trades that result
in greater emissions in overburdened communities.' However, this utopian
market regime (utopian from an environmental justice perspective) is not
likely to emerge any time soon for a variety of economic, technical, legal,
and political reasons. First and perhaps most important is that the older,
bigger, and most polluting facilities are already located near the poor and
people-of-color communities, and many of these facilities are not in
compliance with current pollution control requirements.- Any reductions
in emissions from these older facilities are likely to come from enforcement
of existing legal requirements, not surplus reductions, and therefore will be
unavailable to sell as offsets.' Secondly, for economic reasons, the
upgrading of these older facilities is tied to a decision to increase production
capacity,61 which in turn will lead to the potential output of greater (not
lesser) emissions, which in turn will require the facility operators to buy
(rather than sell) pollution credits.62
Another reason to be pessimistic about the likelihood of an
environmental justice-friendly market is that the primary proponents of
market regimes, for philosophical reasons, are strong advocates of a market
that is as unfettered as possible. Another reason is that some firms
perpetually balk at requirements to install continuous emissions monitoring
equipment, and the EPA capitulates to this resistence.' This equipment is
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necessary to adequately monitor ongoing trades. And last but not least, the
utopian market will likely never arrive because of the lure of point source
to non-point source trades, i.e., using nonpoint reductions (scrapping old
cars, reducing vehicle miles, fleets with lower emissions) to forgive point
source increases (facilities)." Nonpoint trades, by their very nature, cannot
be adequately measured and verified. Inter-pollutant trades have additional
problems because the types of pollutants being traded might have different
health impacts.' The same problems of distribution, measurement, and
verification also plague open market regimes and do so without at least the
minimal protection of a theoretical cap or limit. In short, the .recent
experience with market programs illustrates how reforms premised upon
notions of efficiency are promoted rigorously, with little attention given to
equity concerns such as the distributional consequences.
Despite the promotion of market strategies as efficient, from a
broader perspective it still remains unresolved whether there is a true
conflict between efficiency and equity. This is because, as a political reality,
market regimes are rigorously promoted because they promise to be more
cost effective and allow more operational flexibility to the regulated
community, not because they are more efficient to society as a whole.
However, it could very well be that market programs are really inefficient
once one considers that toxic hot spots-and the environmental, health, and
economic problems that result from them-are costly. These latter costs are
diffuse and typically borne by society as a whole rather than the private
business sector and, therefore, enter into the regulatory calculus to a much
lesser extent, making a more comprehensive efficiency analysis of this
important regulatory strategy illusive.' Although market programs are an
inevitable fact of regulatory life, the continuing battle on this front has to
include a sustained effort to get regulators to curb their zeal for market
strategies and to seriously consider the societal and economic costs of
markets that lack adequate protections for vulnerable communities.
That efficiency is, to a large degree, equated with industry cost
effectiveness leads to the very heart of the environmental justice dilemma,
and brings with it a sober prediction. For the last decade, environmental
justice activists have been addressing the effects of the skewed way in
which our environmental laws have been enforced. This has been a difficult
battle because the significant potential for adverse environmental justice
consequences lies embedded deep within the technicalities of regulatory
requirements. One of the lessons that activists have learned in the last
decade is that-however appropriate is the ethical force of their
positions-to be effective, they must also engage and participate in the
process at its most technical level. They have done so, effectively analyzing
complicated permits,67 the design of regulatory programs,' and criteria
(standards) development.' But they have even more serious challenges
awaiting them, and once again much of what awaits them comes from the
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philosophical appeal of efficiency and the regulatory appeal of market
programs.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
The Bush administration is expanding the move toward market
programs that began in the Clinton administration. For example, new
source review (a major air permitting program) is being redesigned to
routinely allow facility-wide caps in lieu of traditional control.' The new
implementation of the "TMDL program"' under the Clean Water Act (a
regulatory planning program designed to address water bodies that do not
currently meet water quality standards) also has a strong trading regime (a
favored goal of industry).' Environmental justice activists must continue
to question the design of these strategies, at the state and national
programmatic level. Otherwise, the multiple hot spots that will follow at the
local level, and the necessary responses to them, will continue to strain the
limited resources of the local environmental justice organizations.
But pollution markets are not the only place that the rhetorical
appeal of efficiency is making headway. New methodologies for measuring
the costs and benefits of regulation are underway, and these methodologies
will seriously impact the result of a cost-benefit analysis, which in turn will
affect the agency's decision to go forward with-or refrain from going
forward with--regulations that have the potential to improve conditions in
environmental justice communities.
Recently, the EPA's cost-benefit methodology hasbeen under attack
and in some instances the challengers were successful in invalidating
protective regulations. The premier example is the EPA's ill-fated proposed
ban on asbestos, which-despite over ten years of hard work by the
EPA-the Fifth Circuit invalidated. 3 The Court, among other things,
essentially held that if the EPA was going to project costs of a regulation
into the future, and discount those costs to present value, it should similarly
discount the future benefits of a regulation to a present value as well.74
Discounting is a procedure used by economists to evaluate, in present
dollar values, investments that produce future incomes. At a three percent
discount rate, for example, the present value of $100 earned a year from
now is $97 today.
The problem, however, is that the benefits of environmental
regulations are often measured in lives saved. The first part of this problem
is the obvious ethical dilemma, that of translating a human life into a dollar
amount. Such valuation is necessary in some contexts, such as wrongful
death suits where the only available remedy is monetary compensation. But
in the context of regulatory cost-benefit analysis, the enterprise of
"monetizing" human life and other noneconomic values is much more
problematic. Law professor Liza Heinzerling and environmental economist
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Frank Ackerman have pointed out several serious flaws inherent in this
process and in particular criticize the practice of discounting the benefits of
statistically saved lives.' They note that,
[wihile discounting makes sense in comparing alternative
financialinvestments, it cannot reasonably be used to make a
choice between preventing noneconomic harms to present
generations and preventing similar harms to future
generations. Nor can discounting reasonably be used even to
make a choice between harms to the current generations; the
choice between preventing an automobile fatality and a
cancer death should not turn on prevailing rates of return on
financial investments. 76
As they point out, discounting would downgrade the importance
of environmental regulation generally and would particularly trivialize
long-term environmental risks.7 The ultimate result is to distort
environmental protection, favoring those regulations that aim to save lives
lost in the near future (such as those lost by accidents) and disfavoring
regulations potentially saving lives otherwise lost by illnesses stemming
from chronic exposures and following long latency periods, i.e., the types
of illnesses that thrive in environmental justice communities. Making future
lives saved count less on a regulatory scale, without further inquiry into the
distributional implications of that determination (i.e., who those statistical
lives are likely to belong to), is perhaps the most modern form of elevating
notions of efficiency over equity considerations.
Another battle that is currently brewing in the hyper-technical
world of the cost-benefit analysis is in response to efforts coming from the
Office of Management and Budget. OIRA director John Graham78 is
promoting the idea of QALYs, or quality-adjusted life years. The thrust of
this new twist on the cost-benefit analysis is to measure statistical years
rather than lives-and to do so qualitatively rather than quantitativelydepending upon the circumstances of the statistically exposed person.' As
a result, a year in the life of an 85-year-old arthritic asthmatic is worth less,
on a regulatory scale, than the life of an athletic, healthy 20-year old due to
the differences in health and remaining life span. If this idea gains traction
in regulatory circles, the implications of this new methodology could mean
that regulations that primarily protect vulnerable populations will be less
likely tobe cost-justified than regulations that protect healthier populations,
despite the fact that both regulations would save the same amount of
statistical lives (absent the use of QALYs). For example, short-term peaks
(or spikes) of air emissions of sulfur dioxide primarily affect asthmatics
rather than healthy populations, so a regulation aimed at reducing SO 2
spikes would be less likely to be cost justified than other forms of
regulation. There is a statistically greater incidence of asthma and other
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respiratory illnesses among children of color.81 Similarly, the QALY
methodology could affect the cost-benefit calculus of regulations designed
to ultimately reduce blood lead levels. African-American children as a
group have comparatively high incidences of elevated blood lead levels.'Z
Given the low visibility of these technical issues, the ability of
environmentalists (and environmental justice activists) to garner public
support is questionable. It is these arcane, highly technical issues, which
originate in sites where environmental justice activism has not yet gained
access (here the initiative is coming from the Office of Management and
Budget), that may pose the biggest challenges for the environmental justice
advocates in years to come. And, reminiscent of the early years of the
environmental justice movement, it will return activists to their former
excluded positions.
Another serious challenge, ironically, has been brought on by the
events of September 11. The Bush administration's recently proposed and
enacted homeland security legislation might bode badly for environmental
justice communities.83 Legislation of this nature is part of a larger trend
towards the kind of secrecy measures that will prove harmful for
environmental justice communities. For example, in the wake of September
11, the EPA, other governmental agencies, and private firms removed
information from their websites about the risks of accidental chemical
releases from toxic facilities, despite the speculative efficacy of such
measures from a national security standpoint. The fact that these initiatives
have moved to the national legislative arena makes the challenge an even
more difficult one because activists lack the resources often needed to
exercise influence at the legislative level.'
It is presently unclear to what extent legislation of this nature, when
fully implemented, might affect the obligations of an agency to release
information under the Freedom of Information Act, or even the obligation
of facilities currently required to report information about their releases,
such as information ultimately reported in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI
data).' Although homeland security legislation purports to cover
information about private activity that is "voluntarily" disclosed to the
government, environmental and civil liberty organizations are concerned
that private firms will attempt to use the broad language of the legislation
to keep a wide range of information secret (even information that might be
required by law if voluntarily disclosed in certain situations), declaring that
it falls within the scope of the act and is therefore confidential. This is
particularly likely given the expansive interpretation of existing exemptions
under the Freedom of Information Act adopted by the Department of
Justice under Attorney General Ashcroft.' Moreover, the legislation
contains penalties that will further discourage government employees from
disclosing data and whistleblowers from coming forward with critical
information about health risks.87 Documentation of this nature, much of
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which has been obtained under FOIA request, has played a critical role in
successful environmental justice campaigns, resulting in protective
measures being put into place.' Mapping tools available to these
communities through the Internet also rely heavily upon publicly available
information, including TRI data.89 Even if the availability of most TRI data
is deemed to be outside the scope of the homeland security legislation
(because it is not "voluntarily" disclosed to the government), other
information about the risks posed by private facilities, such as risk
management plans, will likely be included within the scope and will
therefore be unavailable. In our zeal to keep information from terrorists, we
will also keep it away from communities that need it the most. If the secrecy
provisions of homeland security legislation are construed too broadly,
protective measures in environmental justice communities may be the first,
unintended casualties.
Another legislative measure that has recently surfaced that will
likely affect the availability of publicly available information is the Data
Quality Act, a short but powerful provision recently attached as a rider to
an appropriations bill?' This Act imposes a higher burden on the EPA to
establish the reliability of the data it releases, despite the fact that the
quality of such data is largely outside the control of the agency when it is
industry-generated data. The higher burden upon the EPA, and the
processes for challenging the reliability of data, will mean even longer
delays in reporting the data than occurs currently. It might also mean that
much information will not be posted, and, just as in the case of homeland
security, communities will have less information available to them.' An
equally sobering aspect of this new challenge is that, just as in the case of
cost-benefit methodologies and secrecy initiatives, environmental justice
activists will be largely excluded from the fora where these issues are being
discussed and resolved.
CONCLUSION
Environmental justice advocates began their trek as true outsiders,
unwanted guests begrudgingly given a place in the technocratic, expertdriven world of environmental regulation. They were remarkably
successful, even before the Internet became widely available, because they
were resourceful in obtaining information. However, since activists now
depend more heavily upon the participatory, stakeholder model of
regulatory processes to promote their views, their relative lack of access to
information will again place them at a serious disadvantage. Publicly
available information is of greater importance to enVironmental justice
communities because they lack money and, therefore, the access to costly
technical experts that regulated entities and the government routinely
enjoy. In this crucial respect, and also because the new arenas of debate are
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less accessible, there is a great risk that environmental justice will take a
giant step backwards, in effect similar to the initial days when they were
virtually excluded from regulatory processes.
This essay describes a few of the challenges predicted for the
environmental justice movement in the years to come. But it is equally
important to remember that these challenges are occurring within a
regulatory context that is different than the one that existed upon the
movement's entry. It is often argued that we are in a "second-generation"
era of environmental problems, where the regulatory low-hanging fruit has
been picked, i.e., the easy environmental problems have been solved but the
difficult and intractable ones remain.93 We also have fewer societal
resources to address those problems now that public attention and
significant resources are increasingly shifted to other concerns, including
terrorist activity. Another condition that must be kept in mind is that there
is increasing pressure to devolve environmental regulatory authority from
the national to the local level. Although devolution may appear to have
certain advantages, it also has its troubling side. It is by no means clear
whether greater local control will be amenable to community-based
environmental decision making, or whether-because of the concentrated
influence of powerful interest groups at the state and local level, coupled
with significant disparities in the states' abilities to effectively address
environmental problems-devolution will work against localized grassroots
campaigns.
Two things are clear, however. Local organizing is the key to the
vitality of the movement. Yet, paradoxically, there are significant
advantages to addressing environmental justice at the national level and at
the regulatory front end, in the initial design of programs, rather than
reactively at the tail end of a long chain of regulatory processes, as is
typified by permit challenges and siting controversies. Activists understand
this and will continue to organize locally while promoting more democratic
processes and adequate protections at the programmatic level (state or
federal). They will continue to be tenacious and resourceful. Such is cause
for optimism, but to what extent the zeal for market programs and other
forms of innovation, the questionable changes to cost-benefit methodology
and data dissemination, shifted national priorities and devolution will
thwart these efforts remains to be seen. The challenges are indeed daunting.
But then, for environmental justice activists, they always have been.
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